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NOTES
DISPROPORTIONATE ADVANCES BY SHAREHOLDERS OF SUBCHAPTER S
CORPORATION AND THE ONE CLASS OF STOCK REQUIREMENT
International Meadows, Inc., a California Corporation incor-
porated in 1962 for the purpose of operating a golf driving range,
filed a timely election to be taxed as a small business corporation
under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 Dis-
proportionate advances were made by the shareholders of Inter-
national Meadows when the corporation issued non-interest bear-
ing notes to the partners of its predecessor partnership in ex-
change for all the assets of that partnership.2 Held, the fact that
"debt" characterized as "equity" capital may be disproportionate
to the respective common stock interest of the shareholders is
not to be regarded as controlling with respect to the question
of whether there is more than one class of stock within the mean-
ing of section 1371(a). "[W]hether the notes in question can be
considered as 'debt' or as 'equity' under other provisions of the
internal revenue laws, for the purpose of section 1371 such notes
do not change the character of the common stock so as to give
rise to more than one class of stock."" James L. Stinnett, Jr. v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. No. 20 (Feb. 11, 1970).
The Technical Amendments Act of 19584 established Sub-
chapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides
a method by which a small business corporation may elect to be
taxed similar to a partnership. Section 1371 (a) defines a small
business corporation as a corporation which, among other things,
does not have more than one class of stock. The committee hear-
ings on the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 provide no in-
sight into what was contemplated as constituting more than
one class of stock. Those hearings merely set forth the basic
congressional intent for enacting Subchapter S as providing the
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless
otherwise specified.
2. The disproportionate advances were created when the predecessor
partnership of International Meadows, Inc., the J.B.J. Company, transferred
all of its assets to International Meadows in exchange for non-interest bear-
ing corporate notes payable to each partner of J.B.J. Company in an amount
equal to the balance of his capital account as of May 31, 1962. The capital
accounts of J.B.J. Company as of May 31, 1962, did not reflect the percentage
ownership of the partnership, which percentage was equal to the proportion-
ate ownership of the successor corporation, International Meadows, Inc.
3. James L. Stinnett, Jr. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. No. 20 (Feb. 11, 1970);
P-H 1970 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 54.20, 54-162; CCH 1970 TAX CT. REP.
Dec. 29,955, 2331.
4. H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1957).
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capability for a small business "to select the form of business
organization desired, without the necessity of taking into account
major differences in tax consequence."5 When the Revenue Act
of 1964 was passed, no effort was made to clarify the definition
of a second class of stock within the meaning of section 1371.6
The only record of the actual underlying intent of the one class
of stock requirement appears to be the committee hearings on
a very similar act proposed in 1954, which the Senate passed but
which was not incorporated into the final law.7 These hearings
stipulate that "[i]n order to avoid possible complications in the
taxation of preferred stock dividends not earned in the year
distributed, only corporations having one class of stock outstand-
ing may qualify."
This underlying congressional intent of the one class of
stock requirement was quickly buried beneath a deluge of com-
missioner regulations. Although the temporary regulations con-
cerning section 1371 did not elaborate on what constituted a sec-
ond class of stock,9 the amendment to that regulation, promul-
gated fifteen months later, stipulated in part that "[i]f an instru-
ment purporting to be a debt obligation is actually stock, it will
constitute a second class of stock."'0 Based on this definition,
early cases" involving advances to a corporation by its share-
holders were resolved by determining whether the obligation
was debt or equity.12
The traditional debt-equity test was rejected in Gamman v.
Commissioner,3 and a somewhat different approach was pro-
5. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
6. See S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1964).
7. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 317 (1954).
8. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1954).
9. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1371, T.D. 6317, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 1096.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 321.
11. See Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965);
Hoffman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 218 (1966); Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v.
Kennedy, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1 66-176; 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9293; Catalina
Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1964-225, 23 CCH TAX CT.
MEM. 1361.
12. In Catalina Homes, Inc. the court rejected the plea of proportionality
of the shareholder advances by saying "it is of no significance whether the
advances .. .were proportionate to their stockholdings; for respondent ...
has called our attention to other factors indicating that their advances were
placed at the risk of the business." Catalina Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner,
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1964-225, 64-1499; 23 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 1361, 1367. The
plea of proportionality of advances was later recognized in Gamman v. Com-
missioner, 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
13. 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
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posed by the court to determine whether shareholder advances
constituted a second class of stock. The advances in Gamman
were found to be equity, but not a second class of stock "because
the advances were made and the notes were held by the share-
holders in direct proportion to their stockholdings. ' '1 4 Moreover,
the court declared the last sentence of regulation § 1.1371-1 in-
valid.15 Shortly thereafter, the regulation was amended to read
as it does today.16 Under the regulation § 1.1371-1 as amended by
Treasury Decision 6904,17 the court replaced the debt-equity
analysis with a simple test of the proportionality of the ad-
vances.' 8 If the advances were found to be in the same propor-
tion as the common stockholdings, it was deemed immaterial
whether the advances were loans or equity; they simply did not
constitute a second class of stock.
Portage Plastics Co. v. United States' was the first case
which expressly looked beyond the commissioner's regulations
and evaluated the underlying congressional intent for establish-
ing the one class of stock requirement. After determining that
the advances to the corporation by the shareholders were contri-
butions to capital which were disproportionate to their common
stock interest, the court proceeded to present a comprehensive
review of the applicable legislative history. It based its decision
upon the interpretation and application of the language con-
14. Id. at 9.
15. The last sentence of regulation § 1.1371-1 stated: "[i]f an instrument
purporting to be a debt obligation is actually stock, it will constitute a second
class of stock." Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 321.
16. The last sentence of Treasury Regulation § 1.1371-ig (T.D. 6432,
1960-1 Cum. BULL. 321) was deleted and the following inserted. "Obligations
which purport to represent debt but which actually represent equity capital
will generally constitute a second class of stock. However, if such purported
debt obligations are owned solely by the owners of the nominal stock of the
corporation in substantially the same proportion as they own such nominal
stock, such purported debt obligations will be treated as contributions to
capital rather than a second class of stock. But, if an issuance, redemption,
sale, or other transfer of nominal stock, or of purported debt obligations
which actually represent equity capital, results in a change In a shareholder's
proportionate share of nominal stock or his proportionate share of such pur-
ported debt, a new determination shall be made as to whether the corpora-
tion has more than one class of stock as of the time of such change." Treas.
Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6904, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 219.
17. Id.
18. See Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762 (1968); Lewis Building and
Supplies, Inc. v. Commissioner, P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1966-159; 25 CCH TAX CT.
MEm. 844; Nielson v. Commissioner, P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1968-11; 27 CCH TAX
CT. Msm. 44; Novell v. Commissioner, P-H TAX CT. Msm. 1969-225; 28 CCH
TAX CT. MESm. 1307.
19. 301 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Wis. 1969); 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d ff 60-5086;
69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 0 9593.
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tained in the committee reports concerning the 1954 bill stating
that the reason for requiring only one class of stock was to "avoid
possible complications in the taxation of preferred stock divi-
dends not earned in the year of distribution. '"' It found that
where the interest on advances was to be paid only out of net
profit before taxes, no possible complication in the taxation of
the preferred dividends not earned in the year of distribution
could arise.21
The instant case is an extension of the result reached in
Portage Plastics, but it takes a completely different approach. In
Stinnett, the court specifically declared regulation § 1.1371 (g)
invalid as applied to the facts presented.22 The majority opinion
vaguely rested its determination that the disproportionate
equity advances were not a second class of stock on the basic
purpose of Subchapter S. The reasoning in the majority opinion
stemmed primarily from the fact that section 1376 (b) (2) con-
templates shareholder advances to a small business corporation.23
There were, however, two separate concurring opinions repre-
senting the opinion of eleven judges and a dissent supported by
six judges. Although the justices disagreed on why no second
class of stock existed, the fact remains that this case was the
first in which the Tax Court found disproportionate equity ad-
vances not a second class of stock.
It is submitted that the Tax Court reached the proper con-
clusion in Stinnett, but it should have rested its decision on rea-
soning similar to that applied in Portage Plastics. As pointed
out previously, the only record of the actual underlying intent
of the one class of stock requirement is the committee report on
the 1954 act which states that "[i]n order to avoid possible com-
plications in the taxation of preferred stock dividends not earned
in year distributed, only corporations having one class of stock
outstanding may qualify. '24 An analysis of this "complication"
will indicate the problems which the redactors foresaw and their
underlying intent for requiring that a corporation have only
20. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1954).
21. See Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 684, 693 (W.D.
Wis. 1969); 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1 69-5086, 69-5308; 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9593,
85591.
22. P-H 1970 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 54.20, 54-163; CCH 1970 TAX CT.
REP. Dec. 29,955, 2332.
23. See note 22 supra.
CCH 1970 TAX CT. REP. Dec. 29,955, 2332.
24. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1954).
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one class of stock. This analysis will also indicate why the rea-
soning in Stinnett is consistent with that congressional intent.
If a small business corporation with two classes of stock,
"preferred"25 and common, retained the profits of a given year,
under Subchapter S they would become undistributed taxable
income of the corporation and thus taxable income to the com-
mon shareholders for that year. If in the following year the cor-
poration had no profits but paid "dividends" to the "preferred"
shareholders out of those retained earnings, a problem of possible
double taxation of those "dividends" was apparently foreseen
by the redactors. These "dividends" would be taxable income
of the "preferred" shareholder even though the common share-
holders had previously paid taxes on that same amount as undis-
tributed taxable income of the corporation for the prior year.
The complexity in the administration of this possible double
taxation of the "preferred dividends" is the complication the
redactors foresaw 26 and attempted to avoid via the one class of
stock requirement.2 7
In further illustrating the administrative complexity fore-
seen by the redactors, it is helpful to analyze the following three
sets of elements deemed critical by the court in determining
whether shareholder advances created a second class of stock:
(1) the debt or equity character of the advances,
(2) the proportionality or disproportionality of the ad-
vances, and
(3) the "dividends" paid on the advances being either less
or greater than current earnings.
These three sets of elements combine to produce the following
eight possible situations involving shareholder advances:
25. Since a Subchapter S corporation may not have a second class of
stock outstanding, it may not have preferred stock or pay preferred divi-
dends. However, for the purposes of this analysis they are referred to as
preferred with the word enclosed in quotation marks to distinguish such
advances and distributions from true preferred stocks and dividends.
26. See McGaffey, The Requirement that a Subchapter S Corporation
May Have Only One Class of Stock, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 365, 368 (1966).
27. There appear to be possible arguments that the one class of stock
requirement is an effort to prevent liquidation, dividend, and voting advan-
tages of one group of shareholders over others. However, these arguments
appear to have been created after the enactment of the statute as there is
no mention of these advantages In the committee hearings. See S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119, 452-55 (1954); S. ReP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 87-89, 216-26 (1958); S. RE. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 146-47 (1964).
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(1) debt advances that are proportionate, the "dividends"
on which are less than current earnings,
(2) debt advances that are proportionate, the "dividends"
on which are greater than current earnings,
(3) debt advances that are disproportionate, the "dividends"
on which are less than current earnings,
(4) debt advances that are disproportionate, the "dividends"
on which are greater than current earnings,
(5) equity advances that are proportionate, the "dividends"
on which are greater than current earnings,
(6) equity advances that are proportionate, the "dividends"
on which are greater than current earnings,
(7) equity advances that are disproportionate, the "divi-
dends" on which are less than current earnings, and
(8) equity advances that are disproportionate, the "divi-
dends" on which are greater than current earnings.
The following example illustrates the effects of these eight
possible situations. Assume that small business corporation X
has, before interest deduction or dividend distribution, earnings
of $10,000 in year 1 which are retained in the business and no
earnings or losses in year 2. Shareholders A and B each own
fifty per cent of the stock of corporation X, and A has advanced
the corporation an additional $10,000 at a rate of six percent.
In the first four debt-advance situations, the $10,000 ad-
vanced by A is considered a loan, and the $600 (6% x $10,000)
paid to A is interest. This interest is a deductible expense of
the corporation, thus reducing the earnings to $9,400 of taxable
income.2s The undistributed taxable income of $9,400 is taxed
$4,700 each to A and B under section 1373. The $600 interest
Year 1 Year 2
28. Income before interest or dividends $10,000 -0-
Less interest expense 600 $ 600
Net taxable income or (loss) $ 9,400 ($ 600)
Taxable income of shareholder:
A Undistributed taxable income of X $ 4,700 ($ 300)
Interest income 600 600
Total taxable income of A $ 5,300 $ 300
B Undistributed taxable income of X $ 4,700 ($ 300)
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which A received is ordinary income taxable to him personally.
In the following year the interest paid produces a corporate loss
of $600 and is treated as a $300 loss each to A and B. Here again,
A has $600 of taxable interest income. Since the full amount of
undistributed taxable income was taxed to the shareholders ($5,-
300 to A, $4,700 to B in year 1; $300 to A, and $300 loss to B in
year 2), the administrative complexity of double taxation of the
$600 does not exist in the case of debt advances. It is immaterial
whether the advances are proportionate or disproportionate or
whether the interest paid is less than or in excess of current
earnings. The same result would be reached in each case as the
example indicates.
In the case presented by situations five and six, the advances
are equity but they are proportionate to the common shareholder
interest. To create such a situation, the above example must
be amended so that shareholder A and shareholder B have each
advanced the corporation $10,000 which represents equity capi-
tal. The effect of such an arrangement is merely an increase in
the capital base of the corporation. Thus, the capital investment
of each shareholder remains proportionate to his common stock
interest. Whatever the corporation makes as profit becomes in-
come to the shareholder in the same manner and in the same
proportion as if no advances had ever been made to the corpora-
tion. This position was recognized by the court in Gamman
where it was stated that "the notes would have to be considered
a nullity insofar as they purported to give petitioners any rights
and interests in the income and assets of the corporation differ-
ent from the rights and interests they had as owners of all the
capital stock of the corporation.' '29 The commissioner has ac-
quiesced in this position by amending the regulations.80
In resolving the example under this situation, the $10,000
of taxable income for the corporation in year 1 is taxed $5,000
to A and $5,000 to B, and each shareholder reports no gain or
loss in year 2.31 If it is assumed that A and B are each paid $600
29. Gamman v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 1, 9 (1966).
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6904, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 219.
Year 1 Year 2
31. Income before interest or dividends $10,000 0
Dividends 600 $ 600
Net taxable income or (loss) $10,000 -0-
Taxable income of shareholder:
A Undistributed taxable income of X $ 5,000 -0--
B Undistributed taxable income of X $ 5,000 -0--
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in "preferred dividends," no problem arises. Remembering that
the functional tax structure of a Subchapter S corporation is
similar to a partnership, one should conclude that any funds
distributed to A and B in year 2 are not "preferred dividends"
but distributions of prior taxed income.8 2 Since a shareholder
may receive up to the amount of his prior taxed income as non-
taxable corporate distributions," the previously mentioned ad-
ministrative complexity in the taxation of preferred dividends
does not occur. If for some reason only one of the shareholders,
shareholder A, receives this distribution in year 2, the same
result would be reached so long as the distribution is not in
excess of his share of the undistributed taxable income as pro-
scribed in section 1375 (d) (2). This is true because the distri-
bution received by shareholder A should merely be considered
a withdrawal of his prior taxed income. Since the profits were
shared equally by shareholders A and B in year 1, B has a simi-
lar claim against the corporation which is represented in his
share of the prior taxed income remaining in the corporation. 34
If the distribution to one of the shareholders is in excess of
his prior taxed corporate income, then a portion of the distri-
bution must be considered a repayment of the advance and dis-
proportionate advances are created-a completely different sit-
uation. But in all cases of proportional advances, the admin-
istrative complexity in the taxation of preferred dividends is
not created.
The final two situations, seven and eight, present cases of
disproportionate equity advances. In these cases, so long as the
total dividends distributed do not exceed the current earnings,
the problem of taxation of "preferred dividends" does not arise.
32. Assuming that there are no other distributions to shareholders other
than the $600 each to A and B, the result of this allocation on the prior taxed
income would be as follows:
At end of At end of
Year 1 Year 2
Prior taxed income of shareholder:
A $ 4,400 $3,800
B 4,400 3,800
33. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1375(d).
34. Assuming that there are no other distributions to shareholders other
than the $600 to A, the result of this allocation on the prior taxed income
would be as follows:
At end of At end of
Year 1 Year 2
Prior taxed income of shareholder:
A $ 4,400 $3,800
B 4,400 4,400
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This type situation can be illustrated by year 1 of the original
example. In that example shareholder. A had advanced the
corporation $10,000; the corporation had earnings in year 1 of
$10,000, and it paid $600 to shareholder A as preferred dividends.
Internal Revenue Code section 1373 (c) defines undistributed tax-
able income as taxable income minus the amount of money dis-
tributed as dividends during the taxable year plus certain taxes.
Thus, the undistributed taxable income of corporation X for year
1 is $9,400 ($10,000 minus $600 dividends). Internal Revenue
Code section 1373 (b) provides only that each shareholder shall
include in his gross income his proportionate share of the un-
distributed taxable income. In this case shareholder A and B
each include $4,700 in their gross income as their share of the
undistributed taxable income of the corporation. Additionally,
shareholder A must include in his gross income the $600 divi-
dend paid to him by corporation X.85 As this example indicates,
where the advances are disproportionate equity advances, so long
as the dividends distributed are less than current earnings no
complication in the taxation of these "preferred dividends" is
created.
However, in the final situation, where disproportionate
equity advances exist and dividends are paid in excess of cur-
rent earnings, the complication arises exactly as the redactors
of Subchapter S foresaw. Year 2 of the original example illus-
trates this last situation. There the corporation had no income
but paid "preferred dividends" of $600 to shareholder A. Since
no current earnings exist, the distribution must be considered
a distribution of a prior year's earnings." However, these prior
earnings have previously been taxed as undistributed taxable
income. This $600 thus becomes subject to a second taxation,
Year 1
35. Income of X before dividends $10,000
Dividends paid to shareholder B 600
Undistributed taxable income of X $ 9,400
Taxable income of:
Shareholder A:
Undistributed taxable income of X $ 4,700
Dividends distributed by X 600
Total $ 5,300
Shareholder B:
Undistributed taxable income of X $ 4,700
36. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 344.
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which Subchapter S was designed to avoid, unless the distribu-
tion qualifies as a non-taxable distribution under section 1375 (d).
If it is assumed that this $600 distribution qualifies as a non-
taxable distribution of prior taxed income, an administrative
problem arises. If the $600 is merely considered a withdrawal
of one shareholder's portion of the prior taxed income, the cor-
poration has in fact not paid him any "preferred dividend" on
the $10,000 advance, because it merely distributed to that share-
holder funds to which he already had a claim. This is not what
the corporation intended to do; it intended to pay shareholder
A an additional $600 as a return on his advance. On the other
hand, if this distribution is considered a distribution of the cor-
poration and as such chargeable proportionally to each of the
shareholder's prior taxed income, a different problem arises.
This arrangement would result in shareholder A receiving, tax
free, $300 of shareholder B's prior taxed income. This situation
permits shareholder A to receive income which has previously
been taxed to shareholder B-a situation wholly untenable. 87
Therefore, where the advances are disproportionate and
dividends are paid in excess of current earnings, either a prob-
lem in the taxation of the dividends is created or a problem in
the proper allocation of the distribution of prior taxed income
arises. The redactors only foresaw the possible problem result-
ing in the double taxation of these preferred dividends, but as
indicated the alternative possibility proves equally undesirable.
It is submitted that the underlying reason for the confusion
in this area results from an attempt to resolve the issue by apply-
ing a single test where the three separate tests are needed. The
court should raise the following three questions to determine
whether a second class of stock exists under section 1371 (a) (4):
(1) Are the advances debt or equity?
(2) Are the advances proportionate or disproportionate?
37. In this example only $300 of B's after tax dollars were withdrawn tax
free by A. However, as the advances become larger, with higher interest
rates and greater disproportionality, the tax avoidance siphoning increases.
If A had advanced the corporation $100,000 at ten percent with B making
no advances and if A owned one percent of the stock and B 99 percent, then
in the example presented, A could have siphoned off the full $9,900 of B's
prior taxed income. This is inequitable itself, but if it is assumed that A is
in a 70 percent bracket and B is in the 14 percent bracket, then the inequity
becomes even more pronounced.
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(3) Were dividends distributed which were less than the
current earnings or in excess of current earnings?
As shown by the previous analysis, only where the advances
are equity advances which are disproportionate to the common
stock interest with dividends paid which are in excess of current
earnings does a second class of stock exist within the congres-
sional intention of section 1371 (a) (4).
It was previously stated that the court reached the correct
result in Stinnett. To verify that statement the above tests are
applied to the facts of that case. The court clearly stated that it
construed the advances to be equity advances, and petitioner
admitted that the advances were disproportionate. However,
since the notes were non-interest bearing, no "preferred divi-
dends" were paid. Therefore, no dividends were distributed in
excess of current earnings, and the stock did not constitute a
second class of stock.
Since regulation § 1.1371 (g) was declared invalid as applied
to the facts of Stinnett, hopefully the commissioner will ac-
quiesce to that position and amend the regulations to provide
the three step test to determine whether advances constitute a
second class of stock. Such a test would make the regulation
in agreement with the congressional intent prohibiting a second
class of stock and would put at rest a controversy which remains
unsettled after twelve years of existence.
J. Edgerton Pierson, Jr.
COMPULSORY AGREEMENT TO SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS:
A REMEDY NOT ALLOWED
The National Labor Relations Board found the company's
refusal to bargain about a checkoff clause was not made in
good faith and was done solely to frustrate the making of any
collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia approved this finding.1 That court also
enforced the Board's order to the company to cease and desist
from refusing to bargain in good faith and to further bargain
over the checkoff if the union so requested. The court implied
that the Board could require the company to agree to a checkoff
1. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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